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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of the Supreme Court is followed, this right will be protected
with some measure of diligence.
X
AIRPLANE NOISE ABATEMENT - COMMUNITY INITIATIVE
AND THE CONSTITUTION
Airplane noise has constantly plagued persons residing on
property situated near airports. Aircraft, when passing over these
neighboring homes emit noise of high intensity.' The results are
a frequent interference with domestic activity and, at times, in-
juries to both person and property.2 Two new developments,
moreover, will increase the discomfort already sustained. The first,
a general increase in air activity, will in all probability be
responsible for increased disturbances.3  Secondly, the jets in-
troduced by, the commercial carriers will emit noise at a greater
intensity than propeller driven aircraft and their flatter glide
angles will spread the noise over a longer radius.4
In the past, these property owners have sought relief through
actions for trespass and nuisance. When the defendant was a
governmental body, relief was sought for an uncompensated taking
of land.5 The individual lawsuits, however, did not solve the noise
problem. Rather, they were somewhat analogous to a doctor
treating a patient's symptom while neglecting his disease. In the
face of this probable increase in airplane noise, the question
arises as to whether the community, rather than the individual
landowners, should take the initiative in dealing with the problem.
At least one community has realized the need for group action,
and has attempted to control the problem through legislation.
This attempt, however, was found to have exceeded constitutional
limitations. 6  The purpose of this note, therefore, will be to
'America, Jan. 21, 1961, p. 546.
2See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Highland
Park, Inc. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. C1. 1958). As to the
effect of continuous exposure to loud noise see Time, Jan. 2, 1961, p. 29.
3 In 1950, the Federal Aviation Agency air towers reported that air
carriers alone were responsible for approximately four million operations.
By 1960, this figure was increased to approximately seven million. Aviation
Week and Space Technology, May 1, 1961, p. 95.
4 Weibel, Poblems of Federals in the Air Age-Part I, 24 J. Am
L. & Com. 127, 128 (1957). The glide angle is defined as the number of
feet of horizontal movement necessary for each foot of ascent or descent.
Harvey, Landowners' Rights in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma,
56 MicH. L. REv. 1313, 1314 (1958).
5 Note, 74 HARV. L. Rzv. 1581, 1582-84 (1961).6 Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871
(E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
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examine the possibility of constitutionally controlling airplane noise
through such local legislation.
The Obstacle: The Commerce Clause
Congress, pursuant to authority granted by the commerce
clause, first attempted to control aviation through the Air Com-
merce Act of 1926. 7 This act, however, was subject to operational
difficulties such that subsequent amendments failed to alleviate
problems of administration and obolescence. The entire statutory
scheme was re-examined in 1958 and completely revised and
modernized by the Federal Aviation Act.8 However, the authority
pursuant to which congress acted in this area remained the
same.9 The commerce clause is the basis of federal control of
interstate as well as intrastate aviation. 10  Herein lies the
apparent objection to local legislation concerning airplane noise.
The commerce clause has had a long history of conflicting
interpretations.1 ' An early opinion gave the commerce clause a
broad interpretation which appeared to give congress vast powers
over interstate commerce.12  Subsequently, a theory of concurrent
powers evolved which permits a state to regulate an area of
interstate commerce that does not require uniform rules.' 3 The
states, however, were not given unfettered power. They could
not, for example, impose an undue burden on interstate com-
merce or economically discriminate against other states.' 4
The power of the states to regulate certain areas of interstate
commerce is restricted when congress has legislated in the same
areas. Should federal legislation exist in an area where congress
is supreme, a conflicting state statute must fall.' 5 Furthermore,
when congress has expressed an intent to exclusively control
744 Stat. 568 (1926).
8 52 Stat. 973 (1938); Note 57 MicH. L. Rav. 1214, 1215-16 (1959).
See also Lindsey, The Legislative Development of Civil Aviation 1938-1958,
28 J. AIR L. & Com. 18, 31 (1962).
9 72 Stat. 806 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1958).
10 See, e.g., Rosenhan v. United States, 131 F.2d 932, 935 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 318 U.S. 790 (1942); United States v. Drumm, 55 F. Supp.
151, 155 (D. Nev. 1944); Note, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 169, 172-76 (1954).
11 See generally Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 57
VA. L. REv. 1 (1940).
'2 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
13 Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945); Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298, 319 (1851).
14 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
15 U.S. CoNsT. art. VI (supremacy clause); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v.
Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1942).
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or "pre-empt" an area, state legislation irrespective of conflict,
is absolutely prohibited and thus invalid.' 6
Applying these principles to the problem of airplane noise,
it is readily apparent that any local action will have to cover the
entire range of commerce clause objections. First, since congress
has occupied the aviation area, state legislation must not conflict
with the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Secondly, it must be
established that congress did not intend to exclusively control
the regulation of aviation and thereby preclude the states from
exercising their police powers. The final obstacle to be overcome
is that which prohibits a state from unduly burdening interstate
commerce.
Alteration of Flight Altitudes
The Village of Cedarhurst lies directly beneath at least one
of the principal approaches to New York International Airport.
In 1952, the Village attempted to combat the results of airplane
noise by enacting an ordinance prohibiting flights over its territory
at an altitude of less than 1000 feet. If violated, a fine of
$100 would be imposed, and the pilot would face a disorderly
conduct charge.' 7
At the time of the Cedarhurst ordinance, the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938, and the regulations promulgated under it, represented
federal control of aviation. 8 The act, in addition to empowering
the Civil Aeronautics Board to promote safety of flight by prescrib-
ing air traffic rules governing altitudes of flight,' 9 granted to
citizens the right of freedom of transit through the navigable
airspace.20  It defined navigable airspace as "air space above the
minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations.. .,,21
The regulations, in turn, set the minimum altitudes at 1000 feet
for congested areas and 500 feet for non-congested areas. One
exception, however, necessarily allowed a lower altitude for take-
offs and landings. 22
Several airlines brought an action to enjoin the enforcement
of the Cedarhurt ordinance on the ground that it violated the
36 Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 312-15 (1961) (dissenting opinion);
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); Pennsylvania R-1. v. Public
Service Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919).
17 N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 90. For a discussion of the Cedarhurst case see
Weibel, Problems of Federalism in the Air Age-Part II, 24 J. Am L. &
Com. 253, 262-63 (1957).
1852 Stat. 973 (1938).
1952 Stat. 1007 (1938).
2052 Stat. 980 (1938).
2152 Stat. 979 (1938).
22 14 C.F.R. § 60.17 (1962). The present regulation is substantially
similar to that promulgated under the Civil Aeronautics Act. of 1938.
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Constitution.23  The plaintiffs contended that congress had pre-
empted the area and thus the states and municipalities were
prevented from regulating the permissible altitude of air traffic.
Cedarhurst, on the other hand, argued that congress only
regulated the navigable airspace above 1000 feet. The court, in
rejecting the defendant's contention, determined that congress
clearly intended to "empower the Board to make rules as to safe
altitudes of flight at any elevation . .. -24 The court granted
the injunction, holding that the federal regulations pre-empted the
area below as well as above 1000 feet.25 The decision thus fore-
closed one approach to the local regulation of airplane noise.
Abatement of Noise
Another suburb of New York City, however, has recently
proposed an ordinance which may be able to overcome the
constitutional objections raised in Cedarhurst. The Town of
Hempstead, acting in response to complaints from residents, has
proposed an ordinance providing that it shall be a violation for
airplane noise to exceed a prescribed maximum. The Town
will construct highly technical and costly sound-measuring de-
vices to detect such violations. 26  When violated, the penalties
will presumably be similar to those provided for in the Cedarhurst
ordinance, i.e., a fine and possible conviction for disorderly
conduct.
The provisions of the Hempstead ordinance should neither
conflict directly with any of the provisions of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 nor with the regulations issued by the Administrator.
The Federal Aviation Act continues the policy of the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 by giving citizens the right of freedom
of transit through the navigable airspace. It also defines navigable
airspace similarly, with the express addition of including in the
definition that airspace which is necessary for take-offs and
landings.2 7  The Administrator is authorized, inter alia, to prescribe
regulations for navigation and the protection of aircraft and per-
23 Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812, 815
(2d Cir. 1956).
24 Ibid.2 5 The holding does not preclude residents from bringing their private
causes of action. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). The
power of state courts to enjoin certain aviation activity, however, may be
substantially affected. Note, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1581, 1589 (1961).
26For a general discussion of the ordinance, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 13,
1963, p. 43, col. 8. The report indicates, inter alia, that a portable unit
containing $15,000 worth of highly sensitive acoustical measuring devices
will be used to record data and to track down violators. Also, photographs
are to be taken of offending aircraft
2772 Stat. 739 (1958), 49 U.S.C. §1301(24) (1958).
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sons and property on the ground.28  However, neither the act
nor the regulations provide for any control over airplane noise.
Thus direct conflict would appear improbable.
However, the ordinance could still be invalidated if the
federal government has pre-empted the entire area of air navigation.
Certain decisions have indicated that pre-emption only occurs when
congress clearly manifests an intention to exclude the states from
an entire area.29 Thus the mere fact that federal legislation is'
present in a specific area does not of itself warrant a conclusion
of pre-emption. In fact, congress may intentionally control only
part of an area, leaving the states free to pass additional legislation
for local purposes.30  Where, however, the federal statute has
pervasively and broadly regulated an area, a court may conclude
that congress intended pre-emption. 3 1  For example, in Napier
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,32 Georgia and Wisconsin enacted
legislation requiring railroads to utilize a certain type of equipment
on their locomotives. Congress, on the other hand, had delegated
to the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to regulate
locomotive equipment in the smallest detail. The Court determined
that the federal statute was so broad in its coverage as to indicate
an intent on the part of congress to pre-empt the field and
thereby preclude the states from legislating with regard to loco-
motive equipment.
Other decisions have held that the intent of congress to pre-
empt an area is demonstrated only when "the act of Congress fairly
interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State." 33
This test was applied in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit.34 Detroit enacted a smoke abatement ordinance designed
to eliminate the nuisance created by ships docked at its port.
Congress, however, had broadly legislated on the requirements and
inspection of ships' boilers, which were the direct cause of the
nuisance. The Court, after discussing the broad coverage of
the federal statute and considering the purpose of both the federal
and local legislation concluded that no conflict existed. Thus, the
Court held Detroit's ordinance valid as congress had not pre-
empted the field.
2872 Stat. 50 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1348 (1958).
29 See, e.g., California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733 (1949); Maurer v.
Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940); H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire,
306 U.S. 79, 85 (1939).
30Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
31 For a discussion of the factors the Court considers in determining
whether pre-emption has occurred, see Dunham, Congress, The States and
Commerce, 8 J. PUB. L. 46, 59-64 (1959).32272 U.S. 605 (1926).
33Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912). See Reid v. Colorado,
187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902).
34 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
[ VOL. 38
NOTES
The Administrator, under the present aviation statute, is dele-
gated the power to "prescribe air traffic rules and regulations
governing the flight of aircraft, for the navigation, protection and
identification of aircraft, for the protection of persons and property
on the ground." 35 The delegation appears sufficiently broad to
allow the Administrator to prescribe rules concerning airplane
noise.36  This section, however, read as a whole, could readily
be interpreted as merely authorizing measures to protect people
and property on the ground from the risk of an accident.3 7
Congress, in fact, may have interpreted the section in this latter
respect since several legislators have recently introduced bills
seeking to amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 in order
to specifically provide for airplane noise. 38  Thus, the seemingly
broad coverage of the federal statute is at least questionable.
Therefore, applying the reasoning of Napier, any congressional
intent to pre-empt the entire field of air navigation, especially
regulations governing airplane noise, would seem somewhat
doubtful.
As has been indicated, under the Huron test, the intent of
congress to pre-empt an area is determined by the conflict resulting
from the attempt to affect the purposes of the legislation involved.
The Hempstead ordinance is directed at a nuisance disturbing the
health and welfare of its citizens; the federal statute is concerned
with safety of flight. At times, however, the pilots may be
forced to breach safety regulations in order to obey the ordinance.
Assume, for example, that under conditions of poor visibility the
pilot is required to approach for a landing at an altitude which
results in air noise above the maximum set by the ordinance.
If the ordinance were obeyed, the safety regulation would of
necessity, be breached.39 It would appear, therefore, that at times
the Hempstead ordinance could frustrate the application of the
federal regulations. The ordinance would foster what the court,
in Villiage of Cedarhurst, -condemned.
Absent direct conflict and pre-emption, the final problem
regarding the Iempstead ordinance would be whether it will
unduly burden interstate commerce. This problem has two aspects.
The ordinance may result in the enactment of similar local
legislation throughout the country, thereby creating a serious lack
3572 Stat. 750 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
36Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 613 (1926).
37 Note, 57 MicH. L. REv. 1214, 1225 (1959).
38See, e.g., H.R. 2067, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 12254, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S. 3138, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).39 Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871, 875
(E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956), wherein uncontradicted
testimony showed that obedience to the statute would, at times, result in a
breach of safety procedures.
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of uniformity. Secondly, the airlines may not be able to meet
the ordinance's requirements should substantial expenditures be
involved.
A determination that a local regulation creates such an undue
burden in an area where uniformity is necessary would be based
on the factual situation of the particular case. A court will
usually arrive at its decision by weighing the regulation's pro-
motion of local interests against the extent to which it interferes
with the free flow of interstate commerce.40  In Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, Inc.,41 Illinois, as a safety measure, enacted legis-
lation regulating the type of mudguard used by trucks and trailers
within its jurisdiction. The statute differed from those enacted
in neighboring states. The Court weighed the burdensome effect
of the statute on the efficiency of transportation against the ad-
vantage of the safety sought to be promoted. The statute was
held unconstitutional as imposing an undue burden on interstate
commerce.
The Hempstead ordinance will not, on enactment, create the
conflict among local statutes which was present in Bibb. Until
other local governments enact legislation conflicting with the
Hempstead ordinance, the rationale of Bibb will not be applicable. 42
However, even absent such conflict, a court might determine that
the area of aviation demands strict uniformity. Thus, though
the only one of its kind, the ordinance may still be held
unconstitutional. 43
However, the ordinance when enacted, will apparently not
place prohibitive requirements, either technical or financial, on air
carriers, so as to amount to an undue burden on interstate
commerce. Technically, airplane noise can be reduced by a
combination of mufflers and flying technique.44  Such practical
measures were, in fact, recently suggested by the Administrator
as an effective means of diminishing airplane noise without
affecting safety.45 There is no doubt that adapting mufflers to
airplane engines will. cause some additional expenditures. 46 But,
40 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 377-80 (1946); Southern Pac. Co.
v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 779-82 (1945).
41359 U.S. 520 (1959).
42 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, supra note 34, at 446.
See N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1963, p. 43, col. 8, wherein it is stated that the
ordinance "will be the first of its kind in the nation."
43 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
44 Science News Letter, Aug. 5, 1961, p. 91. See also Business Week,
Dec. 21, 1957, p. 88.45 New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 29, 1963, p. 32, col. 3.4GAviation Week and Space Technology, Sept. 19, 1960, p. 41 reports
that the employment of noise suppressors is costing jet operators approximately
1.7 million dollars a month in additional operating costs.
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the mere fact that a business is interstate in nature does not free
it from paying its way.47
Conclusion
Local legislation designed to reduce airplane noise apparently
faces powerful constitutional objections. The Town of Hempstead,
however, has proposed a statute that may surmount these obstacles.
The ordinance will not directly conflict with existing federal
legislation. While there is certainly reason to believe that federal
pre-emption of this area has occurred, an argument to the contrary
can be made. Furthermore, consideration should be given to the
fact that such an ordinance is in all probability the sole remaining
practical means for the community itself to protect its inhabitants
from the adverse effects of air noise. Invalidating it will either
reduce the inhabitants to their grossly inadequate private causes of
action, or compel them to await federal action along the same
lines. Neither of these alternatives provides a present remedy
for the existing community problem.
47 See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450 (1959).
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